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ABSTRACTSUMMARY
The outlook for cconomic development for an important group of middle income
countries has oncc again been buoyed by substantial private capital inflows in the 1990s.Asin
the 1970s, this develOpment has been met with cautious optimism. On the one hand it is
generally accepted that these countries need resource transfers from the rest of the world to
support capital formation and growth. Moreover, it is also generally accepted that private capital
flows contribute on a micro level to efficient allocation of resources. On the other hand, there is
concern that a rapid reversal of market sentiment could impose considerable adjustment costs on
these economies.
In this paper we attempt to quantify the factors that have been widely cited as the
fundamental causes of return of market access for debtor countries. The three broad classes of
fundamentals we consider include internal policy reforms in the debtor countries, debt and debt
service reduction usually associated with Brady Plan restructurings, and changes in the external
environment such as changes in interest rates in industrial countries.
We argue that a useful barometer for access to new lending is the market value of
existing sovereign debt. It follows that a quantitative analysis of the factors that caused the rapid
increase in market values of sovereign debts after 1989 would also provide a better
understanding of the fundamental forces behind the return of access to new international capital.
The historical evidence suggests that fiscal iefonn, privatintion, and debt reduction axe
useful in explaining the relative improvement in the standing of debtor countries in international
credit markets. Thus, debtor countries with strong reform programs axe better prepared to
withstand a deterioration in the external environment. However, the reduction in dollar interest
rates after 1989 appears to the most important determinant in the widespread return of dcbtor
countries to international borrowing.I'
Toevaluate the potential impact of changes in the external environment, we calculate the
effect of increases in dollar interest rates for a "typical" debtor country. This exercise suggests
that debtor countries remain vulnerable to increases in interest rates that art welt within the
range of the experience in recent years)
1DifficWticsofsomedcbtors inrecent monthsfollowing therise of U.S. nics during caily 1994,afterthis paper
wasprepared, point inthe same direction.1..Introduction
The turnaround intheexternal financialposition ofmanydebtor countries since 1989 has
beenphenomenal. Improvement is particularly impressive in countries that have completed
Brady Plan restructuring of their external debt. In the first quarter of 1989 these countries'
external debt sold for an average price of only forty cents on the dollar and private capital
inflows were largely restricted to conceded lending or interest arrears. Various plans for dealing
with thc debt overhang, including the Brady Plan announced on March 10, 1989, were widely
characterized as inadequate to restore access to international capital markets. Some observers, in
fact, predicted that debtor countries might not return to private international capital markets for a
generation.2
Today the recovery in rM economic activity and capital formation in debtor countries is
just beginning, but a financial recovery is well under way. These countries have experienced
very large private capital inflows, real exchange rate appreciation, stockmarket booms, and
dramatic increases in the prices of their external debt (Calvo, Lciderman and Reinhart, 1992). In
some easescapitalinflows have been associated with a return to resource transfers to these
countries similar to those recorded in the 1970sasmeasured by the emergence of sizable balance
of trade deficits.
Do we understand enough about the 1982 crisis to predict that renewed accumulation of
external debt can avoid a repeat of 1982 and the considerable costs that followed for debtor
countries? Unless the memories of invcstors and residents of debtor countries arc very short,
they must believe that there is a difference in the expected outcome of this new roundof
international investment. Js the debt crisis dead, as suggested by several observers recently? Or
is it only sleeping?
2 'Implementation of the Brady Plan,' US Senate (1990) for rcveral prominent economists' views that Brady
rcstnicturing wouldhave little cfrccton the outlook for debtor countries' access to international credit markets.2
Tounderstand this turnaround in market access it is necessary to identify the main factors
that can account for the remarkable improvements in debtor countries' creditworthiness. We
first argue that secondary market prices for syndicated credits arc a useful measure of market
access. We then show that changes in international interest rates, and induced changes in real
exchange rates and real domestic interest rates in debtor countries, can account for jJ of the
improvement in secondary market prices after the first round of Brady Plan restructuring
agreements in early 1990. The empirical relationship between secondary market prices and
international interest rates is robust to changes in model specification and to the time period
considered. In particular, the dominance of international interest rates holds both before 1989,
when yields on sovereign credits rose over time (prices declined), and after 1989 when yields
generally declined (prices rose). This is further confirmed by recent developments outside the
period of our estimations. After this paper was prepared, during February and March 1994 US
interest rates increased substantially while secondary market prices dramatically declinecL3
The decline in real long term interest rates on dollar denominated debt is certainly
reversible, and, in fact, it might very well be reversed in the next year or so. If domestic real
interest rates in debtor countries were to rise also and real exchange rates decline, as would be
normal, many developing countries would probably again experience debt servicing difficulties.
In the next section the relationship between capital inflows and secondary market prices
is developed further. In section 3 a simple model of secondary market prices is proposed and
estimated. Section 4 applies these estimates to an "avenge" Brady plan country in order to
evaluate the source of recent capital inflows. Section 5 summarizes the results.
3me ten-yen USTreasurybondrate increased by about 15%, from 5.7% to 6.6% peryear, whilethe marketprice
index fell by a similar proportion.3
2.Capital Inflows and Secondary Market Prices
The secondary market price of debt is a useful barometer for the climate for private
capital inflows to a debtor cowitry because it reflects both private investors' expectations
concerning the ability of debtor governments to service existing debts and yields on alternative
international investments. The secondary market price is a sensitive indicator because it is
established in an active market for a relatively homogeneous financial instrument. F'urthcrrnorc
it is also more up to date and accurate than private capital flow data—useful properties for an
indicator.
Rising secondary market prices (falling yields) suggest that residents of the debtor
country can also issue new debt or equity on better terms. The important implication for
understanding recent capital inflows is that a larger volume of new borrowing, or sales of cquity,
can credibly be serviced at lower yields. Thus, an improvement in secondary market prices was
a precondition for recently observed private capital inflows to debtor countries. Moreover, a
return of secondary markets to levels reached in 1989 would certainly stop and probably reverse
recent capital inflows. While several recent papers have attempted to directly explain private
capital inflows, this has proven to be a difficult task. The fact that private inflows have been
offset by official outflows, generally in the form of increases in international reserve assets,
makes the existence of a stable relationship between expected yields and private capital flows
unlikely. Different policy reactions over time clearly contaminate reduced form relationships
between expected yields and private capital flows. For this reason we focus on the expected
yield required to induce investors to hold existing debt as the best proxy for the terms on which
residents of emerging markets can issue new debt and equity.
There are two fundamcnul reasons for changes in the terms on which investors hold new
and existing claims on residents of developing countries. The first is changes in yields available
on alternative investments measured in this paper by an appropriate risk-free dollar interest rate.
The second is a change in investors' evaluation of the credit risk peculiar to the developingcountry.4 While easily observed secondary market prices undoubtedly reflect other factors such
as therelative status of government and private debt, our workinghypothesis isthatthe value of
sovereigndebt is closely related to investors overall assessment of the outlook for expected
returnson existing and new investments in the debtor country relative to expected returns on
altcrnativeinvestments (Dooleyetal., 1990).
3.Quantitative Evaluation of Factors Affecting Secondary Market Prices.
While there have been a number of recent commentaries on the end of the debt crisis, it
isinteresting that therehave been relatively few quantitative analyses of what went right While
it is naturalfordisasters togetmore attentionascomparedto fairweather, acarefulevaluation
ofrecent developments can help evaluatethedurabilityofthe improvementinthe situation.In
thissection wediscuss measures of fivefactorsthat might explain secondary market prices for
dcvelopingcountrydebt:(a)Debtreduction;(b) EconomicPolicy Reform;(e)International
InterestRates; (d) Domestic Interest Rates; and (e) Exchange Rates
3a.DebtReduction
A simple model for secondary market prices sets the market price equal to the ratio of
expected present value of debt service payments to the contractualvalueof outstanding debt. It
follows that secondary market prices risc when the numerator, expcctcd payments, rises relative
to the dcnominator, the contractual value. Consequently, these prices axe linked to country
creditworthincss.5 Debt or debt service reduction is expected to increase the price if the present
4Fora formalmodel of capital inflows adjustingto equalize alternative yields see Fernandez-Arias (1993).
5mc relationship bctwecn priccs andcountry risk is distorted in some of the instnzments used in Brady operations
by two factors, however. First, in the numerator, collateral enhancements increase the value of those instnimcnts.
Second, in the denominator, below.market interest rates such as in Brady par bonds, amounts to a lower effective
contractual value. These two biases counteract each other and may conceivably offset in the casc of par bonds,
which would justify the usual practice of using par bond prices. In general, however, they do not offset each other
and need to be adjusted to obtain the so-called stripped prices1 whose le3el would better reflect. country
creditworthiness (See Table 2 for details). In practice, the aa in these stripped prices can be approximated by5
valueof expected payments does not fall proportionately with the reduction in the contractual
valueof thedebt.6As documented by Bacha (1992) andWorldBank(l993), increasesindebt
prices since the announcement oftheBrady Plan in 1989have been larger forBrady Plan
countries as compared to other debtor countries (Figure 1).
Figure1
SecondaryMarket Price(cents on lb. dollar)
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Calculated as a weightedaverage based on commercial bankdebt.
Bradycomics referto Argentina, Costa Rica, thePhilippines,Mexico Nigeria, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Non-Bradycoimbies rerer to Albania, Algeria,Angola, Bolivia, Emil, Bulgaria, Cainaooai, Congo. Cole divoire, Ecuador
Jamaica,Jordan,Morocco,PanamaPens, Poland, Syria, Chile Egypt, Honduras, Htmgazy, Nicaragua and SgaL
Sowee: Salmon Bros.. !P& LDC Debt Repon. and World Bankdata.
Thereis much less agreement concerning the quantitative importance of debt reduction.
The initial skepticism about the Brady Plan on the part of many academic economists was based
on a simple argument. The Plan was voluntary in the sense that banks would not be forced to
exchange their existing claims for new claims with a lower cxpcctcd market value. The
implication was that debt reduction would be expensive in the sense that private debt retired by
the changes in the prices of floating-rate instruments.
Dooley (1988) fort general discussion of buybacks and market prices.6
the Brady Plan would be purchased at a price higher than themarket pricethat would prevail if
thePlanwerenot implemented. Aspointed outinDooley (1988). such price can be expected to
reflect the market value of debt remaining alter the agreement was implemented if banks can
frce-nde as in open-market buybacks.Ifthe banks were in a less strong bargaining position, the
price would be lower and more debt reduction would be possible for the same amount of
resources, but always limited by the banks' voluntary participation constraint.
Given these constraints it is possible to calculate the range of debt reduction that would
result given the resources available to support the deal. As shown by Claessens, Diwan, and
Fernandez-Arias (1992). Brady operations led to prices and debt reduction falling within the
theoretical ranges.
Table 1 provides a summary of the debt reduction obtained by various countries.
Column 1 shows debt retired as measured by the reduction in the present value of debt service
obligations. Debt reduction reflects reductions of contractual debt and interest service as well as
collateralization and new money promises. For example, in agreements where below-market
interest rates on collateralized par Brady bonds were exchanged for old floating rate debt, we
calculate the difference in the present value of the debt service obligations of the two bonds on
the exchange day assuming that each would be serviced in full as contracted. The methodology
used is almost identical to the one used in Claesscns, Diwan and Fernandez-Arias (1992), where
the reader is referred for details.7
7Thconly differenceisthe trcatmcnt of additional newmoney, whose negativeeffect on dcbt reduction is
estimated asa fraction of its nominalvalue (thefraction beingthea-anteprice). Since newmoneypromiseson
the part of bank, were often conditional on countries serving interest over a period of time (notasure thing in the
absence of the deal as reflected in low priccs), this estimation is probably better.Table I
I)elit anti Debt Service Reduction
Scant.: Clansens. Di.ecr.and Fensanda-4 nag (1992) and anthan •n,kulalion
Column 3 shows thc nct paymcntrcccivcdby commcrcial banks. This cash was used to
purchasc collateral for new bonds or more directly for buybacks, but in gcncral the reduction in
(lie contractual present valuc of debt was largely indcpcndcnt of (tic financial cnginccring
irivolvcd. Thcsc calculations indicate that (lie amount olrcsourccs dcvo(cd to the agreements arc
more than a third of tl,c reduction in the contracted prcscnt value of private dcbt. Substantial
additional official Icnding partially offset the reduction in commercial bank debt. Column 4
shows tlic dollar amount ol additional loans madc to the debtor govcnsmcnt by international
organizations and creditor governments to support the Brady Ptaa Thus the pci..dcbt reduction
is lowerandrepresents only IS percent of total dcb (columns 5 and 6). II 'snot difficult to Sec
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C) Completedin twophosci.One way to evaluate the direct effects of debt and debt servicereductionon secondary
marketpricesistoanalyzethe market priceof debt remainingafter the restructuring. Because
pricesof various instruments axedistorted by various features and attachments, such as
collateral,new moneypromises and below-marketinterest rates, column 8 shows strippedprices,
that is thepricesright after the operation adjustedforthese distortions.8 Thesepricesaxea good
indication of the market view on country creditworthinessoncethe benefits of the operation are
fully factored in.
If future repayments to commcreial banks axe positively linked to the country's future
perfonnance, then the efficiency gains of these DDSR operations can be gauged by analyzing the
impact of the operation on prices. In fact, in the absence of efficiency gains, in proportional
terms (stripped) prices would not be expected to increase beyond the decrease in commercial
bank debt (column 2). As pointed out by Dooley ci al. (1990), a fiJi! evaluation of the impact of
debt reduction on the value of remaining private debt should consider the relative seniority of the
varioustypesof debt and the probability that the debtor would have received the loans for
another purpose. If all creditors have the same implicit seniority and share the net present value
of repayments in proportion to exposure, a hypothesis consistent with the findings in Demirguc-
Kunt and Fernandez-Arias (1992) and in Bulow, Rogoff and Bevilaqua (1992), then in the
absence of efficiency gains (stripped) prices would not increase beyond the decrease in total debt
(column 6). Any excess price increase over the no efficiency gain benchmark could then be
safely attributed to efficiency gain9
Unfortunately, the task of estimating the increase in prices due to the operation is
extrcmcly difficult because the appropriate counterfactual price, the price prevailing in the
8Likc the calculation of dcbtreduction equivalent, themethodology for estimating strippcd pricesistaken from
Claessens, Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias (1992), except with respect to the impact of additional new money.
9l3ut pumlyempiricalresults should dcal with the Ihcomtical implications cxplomd in a recent study by Bulow,
Bogoff and Thu (1994), which suggests vezy low efficiency gains.9
absence of the operation, is not observable. Long before the operation was consummated pt-ices
reflected the market expectationson theoutcome of the future operation, which contaminate the
observed prices to an unknown extent. For example, if the last price quoted before the operation
incorporates a perfect forecast of the operation, its comparison with the stripped pt-icc does not
provide any meaningfulinformation on the effectsof a given operation.
Pricesbefore the Brady announcement inMarch1989 maynotbe subjectto this
contaminationbutdonotreflect the changes infundamentals overthe period leading to the
operationdate.For this reason, results based ontheseprices (shownincolumn 7) need to be
taken with caution.Nevertheless, as analyzedin the nextsection,the evidence shows thatthe
only importantfundamental with significantvariation thatwas identifiedis international interest
rates after1990. Therefore, exceptforthe recent operations, especially Argentina, estimations
and inferences made on thisbasis appear reasonable.
3b.Economic Policy Reform
Asecond important aspect of the Brady Planagreements wasthe conditionality associated with
the official creditIt is plausible that the conditionality associated with the Brady Plan
agreements explains the increased market value of existing debt and the turnaround in access to
external markets. It is even morn difficult to quantifj the effects of economic reform on market
valuations of external debt, but it certainly appears that policies changed for the better in Brady
Plan countries. The widespread adoption of market oriented reform programs along with
aggressive fiscal reform may have been an additional important channel through which the
Brady Plan workouts improved the financial position of debtor countries. It is perhaps not
surprising that creditor governments emphasized this aspect of the Plan, cx ante, but it may have
been a surprise that some of the debtor countries implemented fiscal reform changes as
consistently and aggressively as thcy have. This suggests that the impact of fiscal reforms were
not fully credible at the time of the exchanges. Perhaps the effect of improved fiscal policies on10
secondary market prices mayhavebeen gradually incorporated into market prices in countries
where the reform in fact occurred. One measure of a number of important policy changes is the
increase in government revenue net of expenditures other than debt service -- whatis usually
called the primary fiscal surplus)0 As shown in Table 2, some Brady Plan debtors have made
very impressive progress in placing their budgets on a basis where considerable debt service
payments can be financed through taxation rather than additional borrowing.
TABLE 2



















































































































































Sovrce: GoMaan Sacks (1991. 1992)
Another useful measure of fiscal performance
the primiuy surplus less i interest payments
Improvements in this surplusrelative tothe primary surplus am
international real interest rates or a fall in the stock of debt The
operational balances in Table 2 reflects the combined impact of all of these factors.
10
Proceeds from privatization am includcd as a mvernle.
is the operational budget balance. This is
on both domestic and external dcbt.
caused by a fall in domestic or
impressive improvement of theII
lmprovcmcnt in operational balance hai been much more pronounced cornpaztd to the
improvement in the primary balance. Oneofthe important challengesfor evaluatingthe future
is to identify what part of the reduction in real interest payments is a permanent part of the
debtor countrie& positions. One aspect that is clearly permanent is real debt amortization. A
surplus for this operational budget balance for past years means that the real value of outstanding
debt is being reduced. As shown in Table 3, some debtor countries have made substantial gains
in reducing the real value of their net government debt through a normal amortization of
domestic and foreign debt. For sortie countries this has been more important than the debt
reduction discussed above. It is also possible that the fiscal reform will generate a permanent
reduction in the default premia incorporated in interest rates.
Table 3
PublicDebt Ratio
(as a Percent of GOP)
1985 1986 1987 198S 1989 1990 1991 1992
Hungary 42.5 46.7 56.9 52.6 55.5 54.0 NA NA
Poland 43.2 48.5 67.2 65.0 73.0 86.9 NA NA
Philippines 57.6 69.5 76.6 73.5 67.3 71.7 NA NA
Morocco 137.1 127.5 136.3 125.31173 105.2 NA NA
Nigeria 50.1 88.2 133.6118.7 113.3 114.3 NA NA
Argentina 72.2 78.6 89.9 95.9 112.3 943 68.5 62.0
Brazil 50.6 48.0 48.7 45.6 42.2 40.1 47.1 46.5
chile 76.9 85.6 83.7 67.7 52.2 39.8 NA NA
Mexico 51.9 59.2 54.5 61.7 56.1 48.5 35.0 25.0
Venezuela 411 59.9 54.6 53.8 70.4 54.1 46.3 52.0
Note: Domestic and external indebtedness of the public sector minus official reserves.
Source:Goldman Sad's (1991.1992)
It is much less clear, however, that the real interest rates paid on remaining debt will
remain at their current levels over the next few years. We turn to the complex and
interdependent roles of domestic and international interest rates in the next two subsections.12
3c.International Interest Rates
Another potential source of improvement in debtor countries' positions has been the
change in the external environment. The dominant change after 1989 was a fall in nominal and
mat interest rates in the US and other major industrial countries (Figure 2). The rotc of interest
rates is interesting for a number of reasons. First, as shown in Doolcy and Stone (1993) the risc
in international interest rates is the only variable in a regression analysis that has much power in
explainingthe widespreaddecline in secondasy market prices through 1989. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that the expected present value of payments by debtor countries
fell as international interest rates rose. Thus, the rise in debt priccs after the Brady speech would
be consistent with the observed fall in market interest rates.
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Thepotential importance of the fall in international interest rates arises from two sources.
First, therearegoodtheoretical reasons to believe that the value of bothfixed and floating rate
Bradybonds should rise more than proportionally to percentage declines in internatinnal interest
rates,Second, domesticinterest rates paid by debtor governments should fall with international
ratesand there aregoodtheoreticalreasons to predict thatthereduction will be more than
proportionaL
To evaluate the effects of changes in international interest rates it is necessary to identi&
a relevant "discount rate" at which investors translate expected payments from the debtor
government into a present value. Since most of the external debt is denominated in US dollars,
the appropriate discount rate is a risk-free real interest rate available on a dollar denominated
investment that is similar in terms of maturity and in the terms on which the contractual interest
rate is adjusted over time. This is not a straightforward problem. In particular it would at first
seem natural to compare floating rate sovereign debt to floating rate risk free debt. The problem
with this approach is that for risk free floating rate instruments, changes in market interest rates
alter the nominal value of expected payments in fixture time periods. But this is exactly offset by
the change in the discount rate so that the present value of these payments is unchanged.
With floating rate sovereign credits that trade at a considerable discount the effect of a
change in real risk free rate is quite different Assuming that the change in the real risk free rate
does not change the government's ability or willingness to pay, the value of expected payments
in fixture time periods does not change. It follows that the present value of these payments does
change. Thus, both floating rate sovereign credits (and stripped prices) respond to a fall in
international interest rates in a manncr usually associated with fixed rate long term bonds. To
theextent that repaymentsare shared by foreign creditors in proportion to contractual debt
service,theresponse offixed-ratesovereign credits wouldbeevenmorepronouncedbecauseit
wouldincreaseitsshare.t4
If future payments are expected to grow over time, as can be expected in a growing
economy, then the increase in their present value wouldbeproportionally larger than the
decrease in the risk-free rate. Furthermore, if the foreign debt is lower in priority of payment to
other types of debtor government expenditure, secondary market prices would tend to rise by
more than the percentage increase in the present value of total expected payments.
This is a potentially important aspect in understanding the relationship between
international interest rates and secondary market prices.Unlike substantially risk-free
instruments, a fall in the discount rate increases the present value ofth floating and fixed rate
debt of over-indebted countries. Preliminary evidence of the relative performance of floating
and fixed rate Brady bonds indicates that investors consider default on both bonds equally likely
and that market prices of both types of bonds respond to changes in the discount rate as if they
were fixed rate instruments.
3d.Domestic Interest Rates
A change in international interest rates is probably reinforced by changes in domestic
interest rates. Most internal debt is rolled over several times a year in debtor countries, and so
real debt scrvicc payments arc very sensitive to changes in domestic real interest rates.This is
an interesting paxt of these governments' expenditures because, relative to real interest payments
to foreign creditors, real interest rates paid on their domestic debt show a much higher variance
and much higher avenge levels before 1990. Although internal debt is typically smaller than
external debt for these countries, changes in pj real domestic interest payments have been
an important component of total debt service costs.
A rise in domestic debt service payments should, for a given overall capacity to pay,
reduce cxpectcd payments on external debt and in turn lower secondary market prices for
cxtcr-nal debt. If changes in international interest rates generate qualitatively similar changes in
domestic15
rates,as wouldbe expected if capital markets are at all integrated, this would clearly reinforce
the effectof international interest rates on secondary market prices.
3e. Exchange Rates
The potential importance of the real exchange rate of the debtor countxy is
straightforward- Government revenue in domestic currency can cover greater debt service
payments if the foreign currency value of revenues rises, as happens when the local currency
appreciates. Other things being equal, the real appreciation of debtor country currencies shown
in Figure 3 increased the dollar value of government revenues devoted to external debt service.
As with the other variables discussed above, the relevant measure of the real exchange rate is
that expected to prevail over the life of the contract For tack of a better prediction we can take
the current value as an unbiased, but certainly poor, prediction of its future values. As with
domestic interest rates it is also important to consider the relationship between exchange rates
and international interest rates. Capital inflows associated with low international interest rates







Note: An increasein theindex denotes a realexchangerate appreciation.
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A Simple Model orprice Changes since March 1989
The arguments developed abovesuggeststhe following regression hypothesis:




pis the logarithm of secondary market prices;
LTX is the logarithm of the ratio of total long-term debt to exports;
LTG is the logarithm of the ratio of total long-term debt to GNP;
RC'F is the logarithm of the ratio of commercial debt to total long-term debt
r is the logarithm of the long-mn (10 year) US interest rate;
Iisa time trendcomponent
c is the common constant term;
art thc countiy specific intercept terms and
u is the usual error term.
As shown in Dooley and Stone (1993) conventional regressors for secondary market
prices such as the debt export and debt (3D1' ratios, measures of the composition of debt and
fiscal variables explain cross section differences in prices from 1986 through 1990. But the
international intcrest rate is the dominant determinant of the time series behavior of prices. An
important reason to doubt this result is a clear common trend for prices and interest rates over
the 1986 -89 time period. In this paper we extend the sample time period to 1992, a period in
which there was a clear reversal in the trend for both interest ntcs and prices. Results reported
in Table 4 summarize panel regressions for annual data for 21 developing countries over the
1986 to 1992 time period. Results for six countries for which we have data for fiscal balances


























Adj It2 0.22 0.43
Note: I-ratio in parenthesis.
See Appendix for more information.
Table 5










































Note: LPFS and LOFS ale positive transformations of Pt'S and 01'S (primary and
operationalfiscalsurpluses) as afractionof debt outsianding.
Standard deviation in parenthesis. See Appendix forinformation.
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For the larger sample ifable 4) the conventionalmeasures ofdebt relative to the
economic resources available to service the debt have the expected signs and arc statistically
significant at conventional levels. These variables presumably capture the impact of debt
reduction and improvemcnts in the debt service capacity of the debtor country. We also tested
the importance of dummy variables often utilized in this literature to capture the effect of the
announcement of loanloss reserves by someUS banks in 1986 and the announcement of the
Brady plan in1989. These variableswere not significant and did not affect the results when a
simpletimetrend to reflect the gradual settlement of thenegotiationenvironmentduringthe debt
crisiswas alsoincluded.
Forthe smaller sample of countries,table 5, thebasic modelisless satisfactory and
inclusionof theprimary fiscalsurplus does notimprovethestatistical propertiesof thebasic
modeland isnot a signi(icant variable.This is consistent with results reportedin Dooleyand
Stone (1993).
Ourprimary interesthowever is on the sizeand stabilityof theinterestrateeffectAs
shown in table 4, for thelargersample the interest rate has the expected negative sign andisnear
theexpected value of a negative unit elasticity.Thatis a one percent change in the long term US
Treasury bond interest rate, for example from 5 percent to 5.05 percent, generates about a one
percent fall in market price. Moreover, if we add a time trend to the regression the effect of the
interest rate variable increases and is considerably more precisely estimated.
To test the robustness of this result we also divided the sample into two time periods
roughly corresponding to the period of generally rising prices before 1989 and generally rising
prices thereafter (Table 6). Again the interest elasticity has the expected sign and is statistically
significant, although the absolute size of the elasticity in the earlier time period is implausibly
large. While the interest elasticity is -4.91 in the 1986-1989 period, it is -0.75 for the period
1989-1992. This discrepancy can perhaps be explained in terms of an omitted increasing
investor20
pessimism, biasing that elasticity downwards when interest rates made a negative contribution
(1986-1989) and upwards when interest rates made a positive contribution (1989-1992). Such
interpretation is further confirmed by the overall estimated elasticity of -1.70 when a time
dummy is included (Table 4). Wbat appears clear, however, is that interest rates exerted a
substantial effect in the expected direction during both phases. This is reassuring because
interest rates increased in the first period and declined in the second period.

























Notc t-tatioi in parenthesis.
See Appendix formore information.
Ourinterpretation of this evidence is that changes in international interest rates have had
an important influence on market prices of existing debt of developing countries and, in turn, on
themcntry ofresidents of thcse countries to international credit markets.11
1Thc remarkably parallel evolutionofprices in Brady and non-BradycountriesshowninFigure 1 further
confirms the notion that the intcrnational interest rates ale the key underlying factor.21
4.A Simulation Exercise.
In this section we use the results reported in the previoussectionto assess the importance
of interest rate changes and other factors to the evolution of secondary market prices for a
composite "Brady Plan" country.
The econometric results support the use of the following simplified model for country i:
Pa= (cBYrtwhere Bjt(xa)½ (g)'A
(x and g being the exports-to-debtandCINP-to-debtratios).This simple model has a unitary
interest rate elasticity and is homogeneous in the country specific variables exports, GNP and
debt'2
A more concrete assessment of the factors discussed above can be generated by this
simple model. For the purpose of illustration, the Bradydealsconcluded in 1990-1992 (Mexico,
Philippines, Phases I and H, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nigeria and Uruguay) art combined.13
Consider this "avenge" Brady country in March 1989 when the broad outline of the plan was
presented to the market in a speech delivered by Secretary Brady. The contractual value of the
outstanding commercial bank debt was about $81 billion and the avenge market price was about
$0.35. Total external debt was about $196 billion. The reduction in contractual value of the debt
generated by the completed deals as measured by the debt reduction equivalent was about $34
implication of this result is that what matters for the price of commercial bank debt is total debt rather than
commercial bank debt. This is similar to findings in othcr cmpirical studies, for example, Bulow, Rogoff and
Bcvilaqua (1992). Wc stop short of concluding from that evidence that all creditors are equally senior, however,
because this condition is necessary but not sufficient unless restrictive burdensharing models are assumed (for a
discussion, see Dcmirgtlc-Kunt and Fernandez-Arias (1992).
13The Argentina operation is not included because, as noted above, its analysis is complicated by the
inapplicability of prc-Brady prices as bcnclunarks. While lhcse problems arc also present to some extent in other
Brady opcrations, the size of the Argentina operation may significantly distort the avcrage.22
bullion in commercial bank debt and a total net debt reducuion of about $29 billion. The
stripped pricc ol the remaining commercial bank debt immediately after thc restructuring was
about $0.54. 14
The expected present value of payments to commercial banks after the restructuring can
be estimated as the stripped price limes thc debt equivalent outstanding, about $26 billion. "l'rc-
Brady" value of commercial bank debt was about $29 billion. This simple calculation suggests
that if the expected value of official debt was unchanged, the initial market reaction to the Brady
plan focused on the debt reduction but did not generate a mcasurable revision of expectations
about the payments on the debt that could be clearly associated with efficiency gains. This
interpretation is consistent with the view that official creditors sit senior to the banks.
Alternatively, the hypothetical assumption can be made that all creditors are equally
senior. (Notice that this assumption is consistent with the simplified model where prices depend
on total debt, rather that commercial bank debt.) In that case pie-Brady and stripped prices
would apply to total debt. Under this assumption, the total expected present value of payments
increased from about $69 billion in the absence of the operation to $92 billion after the
operation. This would suggest that in the market's view Brady operations entail effects that go
beyond the arithmetic effect of debt reduction.
Forthepurpose of this paper, the important points are: i) whatever the improvements
brought about by the operations, they are relatively permanent and therefore unlikely to
contribute to a down-side risk of falling secondary market prices, and ii) after the operations,
sovereign risk in these countries, as measured by stripped prices, remains substantial.
We now analyze thc evolution of the stripped pricc in the average Brady "country" after
the operations to show that improvements thereafter can be fully accountcd for by the decline in
Computed at the time of each counUy's restructuring.23
internationalinterest rates. This implies that, contrary to widespread belief, these improvements
in creditworthiness need not be associated with new positive developments in fundamentals in
the domestic economy or with the market learning that the benefits of the Brady operations were
larger than anticipated as reflected in the initial market prices. At the completion of the deals
the ten year US treasury bond rate was 8.59percent.In March 1993 the rate stood at 5.85
percent. Other things being equal, our simplified model would predict that this would generate a
46 percent rise in the secondary market price, from $0.43 to 0.63.' The actual market price on
May 8, 1993 was about $0.66. This is a disturbing result For the avenge Brady country
virtually all the increase in secondary market prices since the March 1989 can be accounted for
by thc purely arithmetic effect of one permanent factor, debt reduction, and one reversible
factor, international interest rates.
Moreover, the remaining increase in market prices can easily be accounted for by real
exchange rate appreciations that averaged about 15 percent from March 1990 to March 1993,
specially if the market expected this to be a permanent improvement. The corresponding
increase in (INP measured in dollars would lead the model to predict a rise in market prices of
about $0.03, bringing the predicted price to the actual price of $0.66.
An interesting possibility is even this calculation underestimates the role of international
interest rates and that the rise in market prices can be ovcreplained when the indirect beneficial
effect on growth (and therefore the increase in the exports and GNPratiosx and g) is taken into
account It sterns quite likely that the decline in the dollar risk free interest rate also accounts
for the fall in domestic real interest rates in debtor countries. As discussed above, a fall in
international rates should put downward pressure on domestic rates through interest arbitrage. In
addition each of these governments pays a premium to domestic holders of public debt which in
lSWe assume bert that the expected long run inilation rate for the United States did not change over this interval.
If expectedinflation fell thepredicted change in the pricewould beless since in this case the dollar value of
expected payments thould increase.24
manycases reflects expected inflation and exchange rate dcpreciatioit A change in international
interest rates that casts doubt on the ability of the government to finance debt service without
resorting to the inflation tax could generate immediate increase in nominal and real domestic
interest rates. Thus, a rise in international rates could generate even larger changes in domestic
real rates. ha risc in international interest rates is associated with a more than proportionate
rises in domestic rates, the possibility of a large fall in secondaxy market prices is even more
likely.
This suggeststhatpolicyreformsmay not havebeencrucial for the "average" country.
The explanation is that the change in the primary fiscal surplus for the "avenged country has
been strongly negative since 1989. As mentioned above Mexico has managed a small increase
in its operational surplus since 1989 but this is more than offset by Venezuela.
It is possible that the impressive levels of primary surpluses and expectations about
improved policies have also played an important role in the observed capital inflows. The
difficult question is whether or not these permanent factors could sustain market access if
international interest rates and secondazy market prices fell to levels seen only three years ago.
It could be argued that the volume of private capital inflows recorded in developing
countries is evidence that the improved outlook for these countries is robust to plausible changes
in the economic environment. After all, investors are surely aware that international interest
rates could rise as the industrial countries recover. The answer to this may be that the volume of
private capital inflows is a poor indicator of expectations. In particular, we can think of the
debtor country government as offcring foreign investors shod-term, dollar-denominated
investments that carry an interest rate far in excess of what can be currently earned in the
creditor countries.
This is not to say that the debtor governments have again made the mistake of
guaranteeing dollar-denominated debts of their residents explicitly as they did with syndicated
credits. In this case the exchange and credit guarantee arc both implicit. The dominant form of25
privatecapital inflow (his time is a domestic currency claim on the debtor government, domestic
banks and other domestic firms. The dollarvalue of thesepositions depends on the debtor
government& commitment to defending an exchange rate with the dollar. In many cases the
governments commitment is strong because it has based its inflation target on a fixed exchange
rate. In these circumstances a devaluation is seen as a major departure from the objective of
p6cc stability.
The governments commitment is, to some extent, credible because it has accumulated a
substantial war chest of rescrvcs to be used to defend the exchange ratc policy. In recent years,
about one half of the private inflow to Latin American debtor countries has been matched by
increase in official reserves. Thus, the investor has some comfort that the high domestic
currency interest rate will also be a high dollar interest rate. Moreover, by keeping investments
in the banking system or in government securities, the investor has some assurance that these
investments will be backed by the government even if domestic firms become insolvent This is
all quite reminiscent of the late 70s in that, as long as the private capital flows in and the official
capital flows out, there is no reason to limit the size of the capital inflow. In effect the
government is acting as a a financial intermediary that lends cheap and borrows dear. The only
limiting factor on the volume of such a business is the net worth of the intermediary.
Suppose the debtor government let the exchange rate be determined in a clean float.
Would private capital inflows continue to be veiy large? Our guess is that they would not, and
in fact would not even match the very large current account deficits now being recorded.
5. Conclusions
Secondary market prices may be more informative as a barometer of the financial
strength of a debtor country as compared to the volume of observed private capital inflows. A
reversal in US interest rates could generate real trouble for debtor countries, particularly if it
spreads to domestic markets. The related fall in secondary markets would signal a halt of recent26
capitalinflows, rapid declines in international reserves and exchange rate depreciatiot
Fiscal reform has been impressive in a few countries but in general has not built the kind
of cushion into the finances of most debtor countries that could easily oIftet debt service
payments that would result. Moreover, additional fiscal adjustment might draw much less
popular support if it merely undeipins increased service payments.
There have been important "permanent' improvements in many debtors' financial
positions. Debt reduction, both through external debt restructuring and amortization through
operational budget balances, has reduced the vulnerability of a few debtor countries. Moreover,
permanent reforms of fiscal systems have strengthened the debt service ability of some
countries. Nevertheless, recent capital inflows have not been restricted to countries with strong
economic adjustment programs.Falling dollar interest rates have dramatically reduced
secondary market discounts, and in many cases brought them close to zero (the limiting situation
that characterizes the unrestricted access to markets of solvent sovereign debtors).It seems
likely that rising dollar interest rates could reverse this situation.27
Appendix
The investigation covers the period 1986-1992 for 18 countries and 1988-1992 for three
countriesfor which secondaiy marketprices art available. The countries considered starting in
1986am Argentina,Bolivia,Brazil, Chile, Cote d'lvoirc, Colombia, Costa Rica,Ecuador,
Guatemala,Jamaica,Mexico,Morocco, Nicaragua,Nigeria,Panama,Peru,Philippines, Senegal,
Uruguay and Venezuela. Because of lack of availability of secondary market pricespriorto
1988, the following three countries have a reduced time period (1988-1992): Colombia,
Guatemala and Nigeria Annual data were used because some of the relevant data am not
available at higher frequencies. This should alleviate serial auto correlation due to omitted
variables.. The bulk of the data for secondary market prices come from Salomon Brothers' (end-
of-year price). World interest rate is captured here by the long-mn (10 year) US interest rate
(Source:International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund). Nominal
interest ratesartused because of the difficulty of estimating long-term ex-ante real interest
rates.16 The other variables, that is, ON)', total long-termdebt,commercial debtandexport arc
extracted fromthe World BanlcsWorldDebtTables199 1-1992.Notethat the 1992 figures for
thelattervariablesareprojected figures. The total long-term debtincludes interest arrears.
Commercial debt includesbonddebtandinterest arrears.
EconometricMethods
Thestatistical procedure used in this panelsamplewas GeneralizedLeast Squares, where
country-specificintercepts were considered random. To the extent thatrandomeffects are
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, GLS estimators are consistent and efficient. This
hypothesiswas tested andacceptedat usual confidence levels using the Haussmari
rnisspecification test.
'To the extent that they are correlated,nominalrates are suitable proxies. Sec Fernandez-Arias (1993) for a
justification.23
Thehomogeneity implicit in the use of the (log) ratios LTX, LTG and }tCT was tested
and not rejected at the 95 percent confidencelevelin the context of a more general model
involving the (log of) exports, GNP, commercial debt stocks and total debt stocks.
The robustness of the result was tested by including two time dummy variables: one to
reflect the general drop in secondary market prices in 1987 following a change in the reserve
policy of Citibank and another one to capture the anticipation effect of the announcement of the
Brady Plan in 1989. They were both insignificant when a time trend component was included in
the specification.
Serial auto correlation does not appear to be a problem according to the Sargan-Frazini
test.Correcting for autocorrelation using the Prais-Winsten transformation introduces only
marginal changes to the estimations of interest.29
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